INFLUENCING HAVANA: IS IT POSSIBLE?

Gary H. Maybarduk, PhD

After years of a punishing policy to influence change in Castro’s Cuba by economic embargo and diplomatic isolation, President Obama changed the tactics of US policy to one of openness, reduced economic sanctions—with a clear desire to remove all sanctions—and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. Although the new policy opened doors to new state-to-state cooperation, there is little evidence so far of political liberalization, while other evidence confirms a slowing and perhaps a retreat from economic liberalization.

Fierce and uncompromising debate has long been a characteristic of US-Cuban policy. Each of the many sides of the debate has often attacked the motives and the values of its opponents. Those who have tried to thread through the battle lines with more nuanced views have found little sympathy from the distrustful protagonists. By now, however, the inability to influence significant reform by either of the polar-opposites of the debate—those who support isolation and sanctions on Cuba and the Obama concept of an opening without concessions from Cuba—should cause all parties to step back from strong advocacy to a period of greater analysis and reflection.

This paper is an attempt to add to that process. Proceeding in four parts, it will first review the many and often overlapping theories of barriers to change. Fear of the loss of power by many diverse actors, fear of surviving in a competitive economy, bureaucratic reluctance and ideology are all part of the puzzle. The difficulties of transition—how to move from here to there—without causing meltdown will also be found in this section. Most of our observations are not new and are largely obvious from simple reflection, but they are not generally found in one place and can serve as a basis for the subsequent discussion.

The second part will review the changes that took place under Obama: what worked and what, at least so far, has not. This section will also discuss the impact of external economic events on Cuban policymaking. In the third part we will examine the new policy announced by president Trump. Synthesis will be the focus of the fourth section and an exploration of approaches still to be tried as events in Cuba provide opportunities.

BARRIERS TO CHANGE

The most commonly mentioned barrier to change in Cuba is simply that those in power do not wish to relinquish it. One variation to this theme is that Raúl Castro wants to eventually pass power to his ex-son-in-law, Luis Alberto Rodríguez López-Callejas, head of a conglomerate of military directed industries, GAESA, or to Raúl’s son, Alejandro Castro Espín, currently a colonel in State Security. In this scenario the current designated successor, First Vice-president Miguel Díaz-Canel, would be simply a transition figure.

It is probably safe to say that, even if the family dynasty version is discounted, most Cuban observers and most Cubans believe that the goal of Raúl and

---

1. GAESA, the Spanish acronym for Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A., is the business conglomerate owned by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba.
the men around him is to keep their movement and party alive and in power. Either version requires the continued economic dominance of the state, and the prevention of concentration of power by others, including in the economy. This will be discussed further below. Any policy of reform that would challenge those requirements is likely to be rejected, although the fear of an economic collapse and a general uprising must also be considered by those in power.

Support for the status quo also comes from the Army, the Party and the lower level officials of both. All stand to lose status, power and even their jobs if the Party loses power or a free market economy should arise. There is considerable commentary, including from Raúl, that bureaucratic opposition has been a major problem in implementing even the minor reforms promised by the Sixth Party Congress of 2011.²

All the above-mentioned parties share with the public another fear—how will they fare in a competitive economy. Under the current system, they have reasonable job security, do not have to work hard or perform at elevated levels of competence and enjoy a modicum of a social safety net. For three generations they have been taught that the safety net would not exist in a capitalist system. The failure of the Cuban economic system, the exposure of Cubans to their diaspora, and general globalization of information has given many Cubans a different view of their system compared to the possible alternatives. Nevertheless, in conversations, many middle aged and older Cubans will often raise fears of their ability to adapt.

Winding its way through all the concerns of the various parties is the thorny vine of ideology. Presumably a critical concern to some and of much less concern to others, ideology provides legitimacy to the existing order. It is not just Marxism; the thoughts and pronouncements of Fidel are very important and many of the initial decisions made in the aftermath of the revolution have become its very justification.

Last year at this conference, Larry Catá Backer argued that there were fundamental differences between Chinese Marxist theory and Cuban Marxism. Referring to the documents of the Seventh Party Congress, he wrote:

Chapter 2 takes up the issue of the ownership of the means of production (¶¶ 116–202). Here one comes to one of the central elements of Cuban theory—state ownership. The dominant position of state ownership, when combined with state control (chapter 3) forms the core basis of the theoretical conception of Cuban socialist modernization, whose “perfeccionamiento” is the object of this exercise. This stands in marked contrast to the Chinese General Program; whose central object is state management for the purpose of moving Chinese society closer to its ultimate objective—the establishment of a society so rich it can produce a communist social and economic order.³

Later in a footnote, Backer makes the point again.

One need only compare the General Program of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, supra, and its articulation of the Chinese Party’s basic line, with the caution and reactive approach of the PCC. In both cases, for example, there is a wariness of the errors and allure of “right” and “left” error in theory. But for the Chinese that is merely a caution as they elaborate Marxist Leninist theory in line with emerging historical stages. For the Cubans, the formative historical stage has been reached, and there is only adjustment to protect its essence against a relentless outside world. The General Program of the Chinese Communist Party, for example, embeds avoidance of left and right error within the more important task of integrating the basic line of reform and opening up with the Four Cardinal Principles, with vigilance against errors of the right but “primarily against ‘Left’ tendencies.” In Cuba,

---


on the other hand, it is “Right” error that constitutes the greatest fear.4
And finally, Backer also addresses the difference in attitude on the problem of wealth creation. And for people in Cuba, that suggests the contradiction between motivated workers and a paymaster state which also directs all the means of production to its own ends.

For Cuban Central Planning Marxism that leads almost inexorably to the task of remaking individuals to better serve the state and the project of maintaining a communist society. All of the provisions touching on labor obligations and on the making of the model citizen elaborate the fundamental principle of that model. But it also suggests an almost permanent separation between individuals who serve as revolutionary worker, and those whose function is to serve within the vanguard party apparatus itself. The permanent class struggle element inherent in that produces a theoretical contradiction that is not addressed by the Model. For Asian Markets Marxism, on the other hand, both class struggle, and the relationship of the individual qua (sic) worker to the state takes on a distinct complexion. This is reflected in their respective approaches to wealth differentiation. For Asian Markets Marxism, the rise of income and wealth differentiation must be tolerated as the nation develops its productive forces. ¶85 For Cuban Central Planning Marxism the state must use law to avoid the development of wealth differences. The determination that private enterprises may be limited to the extent they amass too much wealth is a central element of this approach. ¶86

If Backer is correct, and I suspect he is, and if these ideological views extend to the upcoming generation of party leaders (I suspect it will be less important for them), then those views will be a barrier that might survive another decade or two.

However, Backer’s view of the importance of ideology is not universally shared. Arturo López-Levy argues that the more significant difference between China and Cuba has been the power of the Nomenklatura and lower level bureaucrats in the Party, the Government and in the state enterprises, all of whom benefit or believe they benefit from the current system. He argues that Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the late 1970s, came after Chinese bureaucracy had been decimated or at least cowed by Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Cuban bureaucracy has encountered no such disruption or purge.6

As I have mentioned several times in this forum, Raul’s desire to “democratize the Party” may ironically make change more difficult, since it would make change subject to the consent of those most likely to oppose it.

Finally, even if a critical mass of actors at all levels are ready to make major reforms the question becomes how to proceed. Cuban authorities have recognized that economic efficiency requires the elimination of the dual currency system, (essentially a system of multiple exchange rates), and a policy of market prices. Yet to achieve those goals they would have to allow the bankruptcy of many state organizations, and the loss of employment and opportunities for corruption for the lucky and politically reliable people who run them.7 Other needed policy changes such as the growth of the private sector, entrepreneurship in the public and private sector, and the accumulation of wealth for investment are either not understood or viewed as a challenge to the system.

**PRESIDENT OBAMA’S NEW APPROACH**

Before the arrival of the Obama administration, US policy towards Cuba had generally focused on confrontation. Although necessary diplomatic channels were re-established in 1978 with the re-opening of the former embassy as the United States Interests Section (USINT), formal relations remained restricted by both parties. Presidents Jimmy Carter, Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton made various attempts to improve that situation, but Fidel Castro rebuffed all by

---

4. Ibid, footnote 58.
5. Ibid.
7. The closing of State enterprises would also be a challenge to ideology, since it violates the principle that the state must guide the pillars of the economy. This is where the desires to maintain power, preserve ideology, and protect bureaucratic privilege all interlock.
either word or deed. For the most part, however, American administrations were prepared to keep pressure on Cuba through isolation and economic sanctions. The hope was that either the Cuban government would cave or collapse from within. Neither happened.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the retirement of Fidel in 2006, there was renewed hope the “Castro regime” would collapse. It fumbled, suffered from a severe fall in the country’s standard of living and made some important economic changes, but the regime survived, retracted some of its reforms and continued with the assistance from Venezuela.

Coming into office in 2008, President Obama decided to try a different approach. His basic argument was:

After all, these 50 years have shown that isolation has not worked. It is time for a new approach... I believe that we can do more to support the Cuban people and promote our values through engagement. I do not believe we can keep doing the same thing for over five decades and expect a different result... I do not expect the changes I am announcing today to bring about a transformation of Cuban society overnight. But I am convinced that through a policy of engagement, we can more effectively stand up for our values and help the Cuban people help themselves as they move into the 21st century.

President Obama also believed that his loosening of the restrictions on financial transfers would help the private sector while the opening of trade and investment—so much as the law allowed and maybe a bit more—would help the American economy. Also, important to the president’s thinking was the need to appease many of the other countries in Latin America that were threatening to boycott the Summit of the Americas.

So how did Obama’s new policy influence the regime?

There has been an improvement in state-to-state relations. Both sides released some prisoners. New agreements have been achieved on environmental research and oil spill cooperation. Regularly scheduled commercial air travel has been restored, cruise ships can now travel from the US to Cuba, and mail is now directly transferred between the two countries. US credit cards are now accepted in Cuba and an agreement governing law enforcement was signed in the last days of the Obama administration. For the most part, these are important agreements that justify the re-establishment of diplomatic relations. Personally, I was very pleased to see that American diplomats are
now able to travel through the island, a change that I have advocated in and out of government for 20 years.

The restoration of diplomatic relations also seems to have diffused the issue through the rest of Latin America. The Summit of the Americas, which many Latin nations had threatened to boycott, took place without any serious problems.

Politically, inside Cuba, there has been less progress. Obama’s new policy made the Castro regime uncomfortable, even as it embraced the benefits. American hostility has long been a raison d’être for the regime’s internal repression as well as an explanation for its economic failures. Cuban officials continue to blame the US for their difficulties even as they admit their own economic policies have been deficient. In the aftermath of the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, some long-term political prisoners were released, but since then political repression has intensified with a significant increase in the number of short-term detentions.

**Economic Reform**

With the change in administrations, Ben Rhodes, White House Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Speech Writing, recently published a blog entitled “Charting a New Course with Cuba: Two Years of Progress”. Rhodes, of course, was defending President Obama’s policies towards Cuba. As I read his self-congratulatory message I found myself on agreement with some but not all his points. Space prevents me from doing a full analysis, but one egregious assertion deserves comment. Rhodes claims the new policies—including unlimited remittances—has allowed for the growth of the private sector and that proudly reports, “there are now 500,000 licensed independent businesses, a dramatic increase from eight years ago.” I suggest the historical record does not support that claim, and might even be having an opposite effect.

The first progress in restoring a private sector in Cuba came not from the removal of sanctions or more foreign inflows of capital, but because the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s restricted the flow of resources from abroad. Only then did the regime, facing severe economic crisis and political unrest, allow for cuentapropistas.

Initially there was a rapid increase in the number of cuentapropistas rising from a few tens of thousands to 210,000 in January 1996 before falling to 147,000 in 1997. But as the economy improved and Venezuelan money began to flow, the Cuban authorities began to tighten their control over the new entrepreneurs. Inspections were increased and tightened, businesses were closed for alleged violations and new licenses became harder to obtain. By 2010 the number of cuentapropistas was still 147,000. By 2008, however, the world economic downturn had hit Cuba, growth had slowed, capital formation had declined, and consumer goods were disappearing from store.

---

8. Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes of November 17, 2014. Accessed on June 18, 2017 at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-president-cuba-policy-changes. In setting forth the reasoning for President Obama’s trip to Havana in March 2016, Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes echoed President Obama’s argument that “if fifty years of policy has failed, it is time to try something else” (https://medium.com/@rhodes44/president-obama-is-going-to-cuba-heres-why-41ecdk0586d8). It is a catchy phrase that hides a much more historically-complex situation. The embargo has failed to bring down the regime, but it also had other goals. It was provoked by the confiscation of American properties in Cuba. It came after Fidel Castro rejected a serious American attempt to help the new regime and after Fidel had attempted to form an anti-US alliance in Latin America. It continued after Fidel allied himself with the Soviet Union, after the Cuban Missile Crisis and after numerous attempts by Fidel to promote revolution in Latin America and civil wars in Africa. The embargo almost certainly gave pause to those who might also have thought about confiscating American properties without compensation and it certainly made Cuba adventurism more expensive. By Reagan’s tenure the embargo had another vital role, making Russian adventurism in the third world too costly to continue. It worked. The fall of the Soviet Union had many causes including the economic disaster at home. However, the Reagan policy of confronting the Soviet Union everywhere—in Nicaragua, Cuba, Angola and Afghanistan also demonstrated that Soviet attempts at imperialist more expensive than they were worth.


10. Ibid.
the market. With Fidel retired, Raúl was ready to try some new reforms.

In 2008 a new program to reallocate state land to small farmers in usufruct was announced. In 2009 the Obama administration allowed an increase in family remittances. Then in October 2010 and the following year with the Sixth Party Congress there were significant policy changes. The government announced it would cut government employment by 1.5 million. In compensation at least in part, the government opened new opportunities in self-employment. The number of occupations available to cuentapropistas rose by 21 to 178 and later to 201. Cuentapropistas were also allowed to employ non-family members. By 2012 the number of cuentapropistas had risen to 405,000 and to 483,000 by 2014. Some of the new businesses undoubtedly were helped by remittances, but the political decision had nothing to do with improved US-Cuban relations, which did not come until December 2014. It occurred because economic growth in Cuba had slowed and foreign exchange earnings were declining. The regime needed private sector liberalization for political stability.

The most striking Cuban response to the US decision, in December 2015, to reestablish formal relations came the following April with the Seventh Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, which allowed some additional market mechanisms and clarified that private property was really a variation of usufruct ownership. The Guidelines established by the Congress include, “The ownership or management of certain fundamental means of production by non-state natural or legal persons is subject to temporality and other conditions stipulated by the law . . .” The Guidelines also declare “In the forms of non-state management, the concentration of property shall not be allowed” and it added “nor of wealth.” Raúl Castro also made clear the political reasons for control of private property, “depending on the predominance of one form of ownership over another, a country’s social system is determined.” Instead, the Congress made clear that Cuba’s economic growth would come from (easy to control) foreign investment. History and Raúl’s words would suggest that lifting the embargo and encouraging foreign investment in Cuba might well hurt the development of an indigenous private sector.

**PRESIDENT TRUMP TAKES A TURN**

President Trump’s new Cuban policy has yet to be fully defined. However, it will leave much of Obama’s specific policies in place, while changing the tone of the bilateral relationship. It is likely to take more critical view of Cuba’s economic and human rights policies. Government-to-government relations are likely to become more hostile, but probably not enough to derail current agreements.

The specific policy actions will try to draw resources away from the Cuban Government, most specifically GAESA, and towards Cuba’s private sector. Since Trump will leave Obama’s remittance policy in place, he focuses on Americans traveling to Cuba. While Obama could not change the twelve categories of permitted travel to Cuba, he created an honor system. Trump will re-establish an audit system and prevent individual travel for the person-to-person category. Travelers under this category must now go in guided groups and avoid staying in any of the hotels run by GAESA.11 This new policy is likely to discourage many people traveling to Cuba and may slow, but not stop, the rate of growth of the tourist industry.

**CAN WE INFLUENCE HAVANA?**

Cuba is in a Thucydidean stasis, in back and forth movements between the roughly equal forces of reform and the status quo. There is a lot of observable movement, but very little ever changes and when change does occur, it comes slowly. Given the internal tension around the equilibrium, outside influences should be able to shift the balance, but the Cuban system has antibodies that resist such influences, especially those specifically directed to induce change. Then, of course, the outside influences often push in opposite directions. Exogenous economic events have disrupted the stasis, but once they pass the pen-
dulum swings back. The question for American policy makers is therefore: What can they do to encourage political and economic reform in Cuba?

The answer seems to be, not much! There should be little shock at this conclusion. Although not often expressed in writing, my sense many if not most observers of Cuba policy came to this conclusion some time ago. At least all sides of the American debate should be humbled and willing to question their own assumptions and logic. It is time, I believe, to rethink our expectations and strategies.

We might begin by summarizing, with appropriate modifications, the two polar strategies that have dominated the American debate, and then discuss a blend of the two strategies that might be more likely to bring about positive results:

**The Passive Approach**

The first, which most closely reflects Obama’s policy, is to accept that change is likely to come slowly in Cuba, unaffected by US policy. Therefore, our goal should be to help the Cuban people economically through the lifting of the embargo, the opening of trade and the encouragement of American investment in the island. The expectation would be that in the more distant future, after the departure of the current leadership, a new generation of Cuban leaders, less threatened by American policy, would come to see the advantages of economic and political reform.

The passive approach suffers from at least two objections. It does not comfortably fit with the traditionally strong US emphasis on the need for democracy and human rights in the Americas and the theory behind it appears counter-factual to the above analysis in this paper. Taking pressure off the regime is just as likely to work against economic reform and do little to advance political freedoms.

**The Activist Approach**

The activist approach, which would most closely resemble the pre-Obama era, would keep active and public pressure on the Cuban government to update its economy, with greater free markets, and to provide greater political freedom. Its measures could include preserving the embargo, preventing American investment, discouraging Americans traveling to Cuba, and limiting remittances. Such a policy would be less concerned with current Cuban standards of living, but instead on creating a much higher standard of living in the future. Its advantage is that even if it fails, it would allow the United States to continue to place emphasis on the importance of democracy.

The active approach, of course, was tried for fifty years without success. It can be argued, however, that its failure was the result of the compensating policies of, first, the Soviet Union and later Venezuela to provide massive assistance to the regime. Success would depend on the loss of Venezuelan assistance and the absence of new patrons. Even then Cuba is better prepared for that possibility than when Soviet assistance was withdrawn in the early 1990s. There are other alternative scenarios for this policy, but it is hard to give high probabilities of success to any of them.

**The Passive/Aggressive Approach**

There are numerous gradations of policy action between the two polar approaches. My own preference might be called the passive/aggressive approach. It would accept that Cuba’s internal policies are locked tight by intersecting forces that act together to resist change and cemented by hostility to outside influences. This passive/aggressive approach would not challenge Cuban sovereignty, but instead put the burden of ethical conduct on American firms. It could keep President’s Trump’s effort to discourage travelers from using armed forced-con-

---

12. I do not include in my observation those who have long argued that we should let the Cuban people decide on their own system of government and economy. It is one thing to argue that we must recognize our influence is limited and quite another to assume that the government of a one-party state, with serious limitations on free speech and no political freedom, represents the will of the its people.
trolled government hotels.13 Trade and investment would be allowed, but only under certain conditions. Such a policy might require American firms to:

1. Act freely in the hiring and firing (with just cause) of its employees, with no government intermediaries and with no discrimination based on sex, race, or political affiliation;
2. Pay wages directly to the individual with no payments to the government. Firms could deduct normal taxes, so long as they were the same tax rates applicable to other Cuban citizens.
3. Allow their employees to enter freely into voluntary bargaining associations or unions with free and secret elections;
4. Ensure that at least 50 percent of inputs by value—labor, materials, intermediate goods—come from the private sector, either domestic (Cuban) or foreign;
5. Not use any property confiscated from an American citizen and registered with the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission;
6. Not pay any fees or taxes devised to skirt indirectly principles 1–5;
7. Obey all Cuban commercial and labor regulations and laws that do not conflict with principles 1–6 in either letter or spirit.

Principles 1–3 would allow more Cubans to participate in a free labor market. Principle 4 tries to ensure that the earlier principles have some impact. By insisting that at least 50 percent of the firms’ inputs by value must come from the private sector, it would discourage the use of government owned sub-contractors. An alternative formulation of this principle might insist that at least 50 percent of the domestic value added of the firm’s output come from Cuba’s private sector or the firm’s direct employment of workers.

Principle 5 makes the policy compliant with the Helms-Burton Act and tries to prevent legal problems that might arise later.

Principle 6 is self-evident and designed to encourage good faith by the firms involved.

Principle 7 is recognition of Cuban sovereignty as far as is possible and is no more than can be expected from any foreign investor in any country in the world.

It is reasonable to ask if the Cuban Government would accept these principles, but that need not and should not be a matter of negotiation. The principles would apply to American firms, not the Cuban government. The Cuban government could not credibly claim they violate Cuban sovereignty. If the Cuban Government wants American investment, it would have to allow the American firms to meet the requirements of American law. If not, then the onus for the lack of investment would be on the Cuban government. These terms would be reasonable to most countries.14

Will Anything Work?

It is not clear that anything will work, even this author’s constructive engagement proposal. Repeating an earlier observation, Cuba is in a Thucydidean status. It can barely respond to offers of foreign investment from other countries, although it has a clearly stated policy of wanting that investment. It still has not resolved the issues brought forth in the Sixth Party Conference of 2011. It is not even clear that a Cuba with an updated, mostly market economy would accept political reform. Ultimately, after years of arguing that an economic reform would lead to political reform, I have concluded that a political revolution, hopefully peaceful, must come before economic reform can take place.

The best we can do is to offer the Cuban authorities a choice such as constructive engagement and then sit back, until the Cuban government or the Cuban people decide to make a change. In the meantime, we should stop arguing with each other.

13. Trump’s policies might fall under this approach if they were really designed to influence Cuban behavior.